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Note
What’s My Age Again? The Immigrant Age
Problem in the Criminal Justice System
Ross Pearson*
According to government documents, on New Year’s Day,
1997, Gadeise Gebywe celebrated her birthday with a special
1
gift: she gave birth to her daughter, Derartu. And while two
New Year’s birthdays would be rare enough, the coincidence
did not end with mother and daughter. Gadeise’s friend, Amina
2
Adam, was also born on January 1, as were an estimated
3
200,000 other immigrants living in the United States. In reality, odds are Derartu was not born on New Year’s Day, and
maybe not even in 1997. But because Derartu—like Gadeise,
Amina, and roughly 200,000 other refugees—does not have records of her birth, the government uses the date Derartu’s
mother estimated, January 1, 1997, for administrative purpos4
es.
These approximated birth dates allow the government to
5
6
administer benefits and track and control immigration flow,
* Law Clerk to Hon. Ralph Erickson (D.N.D.); J.D. 2013, University of
Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2009, University of Minnesota. The author
thanks Mark Kappelhoff for his encouragement and feedback; Kim Hegvik
and Ryan Younggren for their help developing the topic; Sam Light and the
editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their hard work and diligence; and Laura Stecker for her continuous love and support. Copyright
© 2013 by Ross Pearson.
1. Annie Baxter, Jan. 1 a Common Birth Date for Many Immigrants,
MINN. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 29, 2009), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/
web/2009/12/29/january-1-birthdays/.
2. Id.
3. Michelle Breidenbach, On New Year's Day, Wish a 'Happy Birthday'
to 202,000 Refugees, THE POST-STANDARD, Jan. 1, 2011, http://www.syracuse
.com/news/index.ssf/2011/01/on_new_years_day_wish_a_happy.html.
4. Baxter, supra note 1; Breidenbach, supra note 3.
5. Cf. INNOCENTI RESEARCH CTR., UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND,
BIRTH REGISTRATION AND ARMED CONFLICT 2 (2007), available at http://www
.unicef.org/protection/birth_registration_and_armed_conflict(1).pdf [hereinafter UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION] (discussing hampered access to social services for displaced children around the globe).
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but they lack both certainty and accuracy. This uncertainty and
inaccuracy breeds the immigrant age problem, a problem that
arises when these immigrants clash with a criminal justice system that demands greater age-specificity than these immigrants can provide. Specifically, the immigrant age problem
arises at three stages of the criminal process. First, a defendant’s age may determine which court—juvenile or adult—has
7
jurisdiction, so the prosecutor must know the defendant’s age
to charge him in the right court. Second, a defendant’s or vic8
tim’s age might be an element of the crime, requiring the State
to prove age beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, a defendant’s
9
age may limit the maximum sentence a court may render.
Age matters, but courts have not crafted standards to solve
the immigrant age problem. Different states place different
burdens on prosecutors to prove a defendant’s age as a jurisdic10
tional fact, and many states have not addressed this prob11
lem. Uncertainty surrounding the defendant’s or victim’s age
12
may allow the defendant to escape prosecution. And while the
Supreme Court has held that children under age eighteen cannot get death sentences, courts have not addressed how to determine a proper sentence when they do not know the defend13
ant’s age.

6. See DANIEL C. MARTIN & JAMES E. YANKAY, U. S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2011, at 3 (2012).
7. See MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILES IN COURT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
5 (2003), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/195420/contents
.pdf.
8. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (2011) (criminalizing sexual conduct in
the first degree based on the age difference between the victim and defendant).
9. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding unconstitutional mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles); Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
categorically prohibits life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of
non-homicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (holding death sentences for juveniles categorically unconstitutional).
10. Compare State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 46 (Minn. 2011) (preponderance
of the evidence), with State v. Mohamed, 899 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App.
2008) (beyond a reasonable doubt).
11. See, e.g., E-mail from Kim Hegvik, Assistant State’s Attorney, Cass
Cnty., N.D., to author (Nov. 14, 2012, 14:54 CST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hegvik e-mail].
12. Cf. Laura Yuen, 3 Guilty in Somali Gang Sex Trafficking Case, MINN.
PUB. RADIO (May 4, 2012), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/
05/04/sex-trafficking (noting that defendants challenged victim’s age due to
victim’s invalid birth certificate).
13. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
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This Note develops standards to address the refugee age
problem in the criminal process. Part I examines the origins of
the age problem and discusses the significance of age in each
step of the criminal process: charging, trial, and sentencing.
Next, Part II analyzes the problems age uncertainty creates
and how courts address these issues at each step of the criminal process. Finally, Part III addresses possible solutions and
proposes burdens of proof for each stage of the process. Specifically, this Note argues that (1) at charging, the refugee’s age
documentation should serve as rebuttable proof of age; (2) at
trial, the refugee’s age documentation should not be admissible
for proof of age; and (3) at sentencing, the court should not consider the refugee’s age at all, but rather his “age characteristics.”
I. BACKGROUND
In most cases, the court will know the defendant’s age. In
others, it will not. But current immigration procedures allow
immigrants without known birth dates to obtain official gov14
ernment documents that list their “official” birth dates. Therefore, the immigrant age problem presents a unique dilemma:
the defendant has an “official” date of birth, but the court still
does not know his age.
This section first traces how the immigrant age problem
originates. Specifically, it examines how an immigrant can enter immigration proceedings without knowing his date of birth
and exit with an official document—and therein government
certification—that lists a precise birth date. Next, this section
explores the three stages at which a defendant’s age can substantially affect the criminal process: charging, trial, and sentencing.
A. UNREGISTERED CHILDREN
The immigrant age problem stems from inaccurate birth
documents, so it often begins abroad when children are born
15
but not given official birth records. While the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of a Child dictates that States should
16
register children immediately after birth, births often go un14. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) (2012).
15. UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION, supra note 5, at 3. The process of recording children’s birth dates is called “registration.” Id.
16. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. VII, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
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18

registered, usually for one of four reasons. First, legal requirements may impose barriers on families that prevent them
from registering births. For instance, some states charge high
19
20
registration fees, only register children born in wedlock, or
require parents to identify themselves before they can register
21
their children. Second, countries in armed conflict, such as
Ethiopia and Sudan, lack the administrative systems needed to
22
record and track childbirths. Third, some parents refuse to
register their children out of fear that the government will use
registration logs to target their children for ethnic cleansing or
23
conscription. Finally, some cultures simply do not emphasize
24
birth registration.
Without proper birth registration, children face a number
25
of problems. They might not receive social benefits. They
26
might be unable to reconnect with separated family members.
27
And they might be forcibly trafficked without detection.

24, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.”).
17. Facts
and
Figures,
PLAN,
http://plan-international.org/
birthregistration/the-campaign/facts-and-figures/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
18. Id.
19. Cf. Mariana Muzzi, UNICEF Good Practices in Integrating Birth Registration into Health Systems (2000–2009); Case Studies: Bangladesh, Brazil,
the Gambia and Delhi, India 6 (United Nations Children’s Fund, Working Paper, Jan. 2010), available at http://www.unicef.org/protection/Birth_
Registration_Working_Paper(2).pdf (suggesting making birth registration free
of charge as a way to increase registration).
20. Id. at 42.
21. For example, in certain areas of Peru, parents must present their own
identification to register a child to discourage the parents from associating
with rebel groups. UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION, supra note 5, at 8. Therefore, parents that do not have documents themselves cannot register their
children either. Id.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 10.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 476 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“[M]ost Somalis do not know their exact birth date . . . .” (quoting United
States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 676–77 (E.D. Va. 2010))).
25. UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION, supra note 5, at 11.
26. Id. at 13–14.
27. Id. at 9. For example, in Southeast Europe, non-governmental organizations estimate that 70 percent of trafficked women and girls do not have valid birth documents. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND ET AL., TRAFFICKING
IN HUMAN BEINGS IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 141 (2002), available at http://
www.osce.org/odihr/18540. But cf. ASIAN DEV. BANK, LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 2007: LEGAL IDENTITY FOR INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT 5 (Caroline Vandenabeele & Christine V. Lao eds., 2007)
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Proper documentation alone can help alleviate some of these problems—regardless of whether the document accurately
28
lists the child’s birthday. Therefore, in order to prevent these
problems, many international organizations partner with for29
eign governments to increase registration rates. The goal is
simple: give each child a birth document. But to achieve this
goal, the child’s actual birth date is immaterial. After all, any
form of registration will allow a child to collect social benefits,
30
reunite with separated family, and better avoid trafficking.
Therefore, these organizations allow parents to estimate the
child’s date of birth, sometimes up to ten years after his actual
31
birth. As a result, the child ends up with an official birth doc32
ument with an inaccurate birth date.
B. IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
When children emigrate to – or take refuge in – the United
States, immigration procedures require that the government
give them official documents listing biographical information,
33
including date of birth. In fact, even when the child does not
know his exact date of birth, the government must still give
him an official document that lists a date of birth, albeit an es34
timated date. As a result, by law the child will end up holding
an official government identification with an official birth date,
even though that date is based merely on the child’s (or his
35
parents’) best guess. Specifically, this paradox occurs in two
instances. First, the estimated date of birth listed on a child’s
36
birth registration will become his “official” U.S. birth date. Second, when the child has no registration, he may estimate a
37
birth date, which will then become his “official” birth date.
(noting that in developing countries birth registration might not fix these
problems).
28. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
29. See Muzzi, supra note 19, at 5.
30. Id. at 35.
31. See CLAIRE CODY, PLAN, COUNT EVERY CHILD: THE RIGHT TO BIRTH
REGISTRATION 63 (2009) [hereinafter PLAN, COUNT EVERY CHILD], available at
http://plan-international.org/birthregistration/files/count-every-child-2009.
32. See id.
33. See E-mail from Steve Blando, Pub. Affairs Officer, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., to author (Oct. 23, 2012, 08:32 CST) [hereinafter Blando
e-mail] (on file with author).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See supra Part I.A.
37. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) (2012).
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United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) requires immigrants and asylees to present a birth
38
certificate when they apply to immigrate to the U.S. But the
USCIS Handbook neither defines “birth certificate” nor limits
acceptable birth certificates to countries with high registration
39
rates. Therefore, USCIS will accept birth certificates from
nongovernmental organizations or countries with poor registra40
tion rates—both of which may contain estimated birth dates.
This process makes the first path from estimated to official
birth date simple. The child is born. Years later, a nongovernmental organization registers his birth using a date his parents
41
42
estimate. The child presents this certificate to USCIS. And
this date becomes his “official birth date” for all other govern43
ment documents.
Second, when applicants do not have any birth documents,
44
USCIS allows them to estimate their birth dates. Before estimating their birth dates, these applicants must first prove that
45
their birth documents are unavailable. But proving these documents are unavailable is not always difficult. For instance,
the applicant may submit a letter from his home nation that
46
his birth document does not exist, or he can show that he
made good faith (but fruitless) attempts to get his birth docu47
ment. USCIS will then waive the birth document require38. See id. § 103.2(b)(1) (“Each benefit request must be properly completed
and filed with all initial evidence required by applicable regulations and other
USCIS instructions.”); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 1615-0037, FORM I-730 REFUGEE/ASYLEE
RELATIVE PETITION INSTRUCTIONS 3–4 (2013) [hereinafter FORM I-730] (requiring a birth certificate for applications from relatives).
39. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2 (not defining birth certificate).
40. Cf. id. (stating only that a birth certificate is a required document).
41. See supra Part I.A.
42. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1).
43. See Blando e-mail, supra note 33.
44. See FORM I-730, supra note 38, at 4.
45. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(ii).
46. Id. In fact, if the State Department’s Visa Reciprocity Tables state
that the applicant’s home country normally does not keep birth documents,
USCIS may accept other proof of birth without a letter from the home country.
Blando e-mail, supra note 33. For example, a Somali refugee would not need to
show his birth document is unavailable because the State Department’s Visa
Reciprocity Table for Somalia notes, “There are no police records, birth certificates, school records etc., available from Somalia.” County Reciprocity Schedule, Somalia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/visa/fees/fees_5455
.html?cid=9738 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
47. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(ii).
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48

ment. With this requirement waived, USCIS permits the ap49
plicant to submit “secondary evidence” —such as school rec50
ords—and his own testimony, which USCIS will use to estimate the applicant’s age.
In both cases, the estimated birth date becomes part of the
51
applicant’s immigration file, as well as his official birth date
52
on government records. In effect, USCIS certifies that the
date of birth is accurate.
How prevalent is this problem? It is unclear—USCIS does
not specifically track how often it assigns official-yet-inaccurate
53
birth dates. But government immigration statistics suggest
that the problem occurs with some level of frequency. For instance, according to the State Department, in war-torn Iraq
birth registration documents are frequently “withheld in indi54
vidual cases for political or other reasons.” Therefore, when
Iraqi children take refuge in the United States, USCIS will as55
sign them birth dates. And these Iraqi children are not
56
alone—USCIS will also assign birth dates to Bhutanese,
57
58
Somalian, and Iranian children, none of whom come from
countries that keep birth records. Over the three-year span
from 2009 to 2011, over 105,000 people took refuge in the U.S.
48. See id. § 103.2(b)(2)(i).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 103.2(b)(7).
51. Blando e-mail, supra note 33.
52. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., OMB NO. 1615-0023, INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-485, APPLICATION TO REGISTER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR ADJUST STATUS 3 (2013) (using this process
for registering for permanent residence). In fact, this estimated birth date procedure does not just apply to immigrants. A U.S. citizen may obtain a passport
upon a sworn affidavit of birth and evidence that no record of his birth exists.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OMB APPROVAL NO. 1405-0132, BIRTH AFFIDAVIT (2011)
(“A birth affidavit should be submitted (with an application for a U.S. passport) when an acceptable birth certificate cannot be obtained for a person born
in the United States. The affidavit must be accompanied by a notice from the
appropriate authorities indicating that no birth record exists and a photocopy
of the front and back side of the affiant’s identification.”).
53. Blando e-mail, supra note 33.
54. Country Reciprocity Schedule, Iraq, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel
.state.gov/visa/fees/fees_5455.html?cid=9218 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
55. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
56. See Country Reciprocity Schedule, Bhutan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/fees/fees_5455.html?cid=9005 (last visited Oct. 31,
2013).
57. See Country Reciprocity Schedule, Somalia, supra note 46.
58. See Country Reciprocity Schedule, Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://
travel.state.gov/visa/fees/fees_5455.html?cid=9217 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
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59

from one of these four countries, a stream of people with estimated birth dates certified as official. Therefore, while the fre60
quency of the immigrant age problem is unknown, immigration statistics suggest that the age problem is potentially vast.
C. AGE AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
In many contexts, a child’s exact birth date is both immaterial and malleable—as any summer-born third grader forced
to celebrate with his classmates in January would know. But
the criminal justice system specifically distinguishes based on
age in three contexts: determining jurisdiction, proving age61
specific elements, and imposing maximum sentences. The
immigrant age problem, therefore, arises when children with
uncertain-yet-official birth dates collide with the criminal justice system in one of these contexts.
1. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
In the criminal justice process, the defendant’s age first
matters when the state must decide whether to charge the de62
fendant in juvenile or adult court. At charging, age is relevant
for two reasons. First, the defendant’s age determines which
63
court has original jurisdiction. Most juvenile courts have ju64
risdiction over children up to age eighteen, while other states
65
66
use lower limits, such as sixteen or seventeen. Second, some
states set maximum age limits for juvenile courts to rehabilitate defendants, so once the defendant reaches the maximum
67
age, he “ages out” and the juvenile court loses jurisdiction.

59. See MARTIN & YANKAY, supra note 6, at 3.
60. See Blando e-mail, supra note 33.
61. See, e.g., H.D. Warren & C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Age of Child at Time
of Alleged Offense or Delinquency, or at Time of Legal Proceedings, as Criterion
of Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court, 89 A.L.R.2d 506 § 2 (1963).
62. Id. § 3(d).
63. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30822, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT AND RELATED MATTERS 7–26 (2004).
64. Id.; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.007 subd. 3 (2012).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) (2012).
66. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2)(A) (West 2009).
67. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-36(6) (2012) (“[W]hen the child attains the age of twenty years, all orders affecting the child then in force terminate and the child is discharged from further obligation or control.”).
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Therefore, the defendant’s age affects whether the juvenile
68
court has jurisdiction, and for how long.
In fact, age is most relevant in the criminal process in juvenile court due to the lower penalties for juveniles than
adults. For example, imagine that two Fargo teens rob a 7Eleven, and each fires a shot, a class A felony in North Dako69
ta. The first robber is seventeen, so the juvenile court will
70
have jurisdiction, and he will age out of juvenile court at age
71
twenty. The second robber, however, is eighteen, so the dis72
trict court will have jurisdiction, and he will face a maximum
73
penalty of twenty years in jail. Therefore, even though the two
defendants committed the same crimes, they face substantially
different punishments if convicted. The first robber will be free
74
when he is twenty. The second robber may not be free until
75
he’s nearly forty.
Therefore, whether the juvenile or adult court has jurisdiction significantly affects the sentence the defendant will receive. And because the defendant’s age determines which court
76
has jurisdiction, the defendant’s age significantly affects the
sentence he could serve. So the immigrant with an assigned
birth date has a substantial interest in his age when the state
77
charges him with a crime.
However, two exceptions to a juvenile court’s exclusive age
jurisdiction over children make the age problem less relevant.
First, some states give juvenile and district courts concurrent
jurisdiction, so the State may choose to prosecute the child in
68. For instance, if a district court found that the defendant was a child,
but his birth certificate showed he was an adult, the juvenile court would end
up having jurisdiction due to the district court order. However, the juvenile
court would again risk losing jurisdiction, because it could only rehabilitate
the child up until a certain age. This critical age, in turn, would have to be determined based on his or her faulty birth certificate. See, e.g., Hegvik e-mail,
supra note 11.
69. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 (2012) (classifying robbery as an A
felony when the perpetrator fires a firearm). In North Dakota, a Class A felony
is a felony that carries a maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment and
a twenty thousand dollar fine. Id. § 12.1-32-01(2).
70. Id. § 27-20-03.
71. See id. § 27-20-36(6).
72. See id. §§ 27-20-02(4)(a), 27-20-03 (giving juvenile courts jurisdiction
for a child under the age of eighteen).
73. See id. § 12.1-32-01(2).
74. See id. § 27-20-36(6).
75. See id. § 12.1-32-01(2).
76. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Hegvik e-mail, supra note 11.
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78

either juvenile or adult court. Therefore, even when it is unclear whether an immigrant is, say, seventeen or eighteen, the
79
State may choose to prosecute him in a district court. Second,
juvenile courts may waive or transfer jurisdiction to district
80
courts based on the nature of the crime or the offender’s age
81
combined with various aggravating factors. In these states,
the uncertainty surrounding an immigrant’s age may not serve
as a bar to prosecution in adult court because the juvenile court
may waive jurisdiction and allow the state to prosecute in dis82
trict court regardless of the offender’s age.
Nonetheless, in states where the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, or the juvenile court chooses not to waive jurisdiction, the immigrant’s age can significantly impact his sen83
tence.
2. Age as an Element of the Crime
The age problem also arises when age is an element of the
84
crime, so the state must prove the victim’s or defendant’s age
85
beyond a reasonable doubt. Minnesota’s criminal code, for example, criminalizes statutory rape based on the victim’s age:
sex with a victim less than thirteen years old is criminal sexual
86
conduct, even if the victim consents. But Minnesota classifies
the degree of criminal sexual conduct based on the defendant’s
age. If the defendant was three years older than the victim, he
87
committed first degree sexual conduct, and he must serve at
88
least twelve years in jail. If the defendant was less than three
years older than the victim, he only committed third degree
78. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501(B) (LexisNexis 2012).
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127(b) (2012) (permitting juvenile court to waive jurisdiction for C or D felonies).
81. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-203(a), (d) (2012) (permitting a court to
waive jurisdiction for any child over fourteen years old based on six factors).
82. See id. Yet even in states where juvenile courts may waive jurisdiction, the court must still know the defendant’s age to determine if he is old
enough to transfer into an adult court. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.45(6) (2012)
(permitting the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction for any crime if the defendant is at least fourteen years old).
83. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Yuen, supra note 12.
85. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
86. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342 subd. 1 (2012) (criminalizing sexual
conduct based on the age difference between the defendant and victim).
87. Id.
88. Id. § 609.342 subd. 2(b).
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90

sexual conduct, which carries no minimum sentence. Therefore, to ensure a minimum jail sentence for the defendant, the
state must prove two age-specific elements: (1) the victim was
thirteen or younger; and (2) the defendant was at least three
91
years older than the victim.
However, if either the victim or the defendant has an official-yet-inaccurate birth dates, the 12-year difference in mini92
mum jail time may depend on the age USCIS assigned the
93
victim or defendant based on an estimate.
3. Age as a Sentencing Factor
Finally, the immigrant age problem arises in sentencing
when a court must determine whether it can sentence the defendant to death or life without parole for a non-homicide offense, both of which the Supreme Court has categorically pro94
hibited for defendants under eighteen. First, in Roper v.
Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit states from executing children that
95
committed capital crimes before they turned eighteen. In Roper, the Court drew a bright line based on age: the state may not
execute a seventeen year old, but it may execute an eighteen
96
year old. More recently, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from sentencing
97
juveniles to life without parole for non-homicide offenses. As
in Roper, the Graham Court structured its prohibition of life
without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses solely based
of the defendant’s age, so the state may sentence an eighteen

89. Id. § 609.344 subd. 1(a).
90. Id. § 609.344 subd. 2.
91. Id. § 609.342 subd. 1(a).
92. See supra notes 88, 90 and accompanying text.
93. See supra Part I.A.
94. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (prohibiting imposition of life without parole for a non-homicide offense on a juvenile); Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (forbidding death penalty under the
age of 18). Courts may also consider a defendant’s age and age characteristics
to mitigate the defendant’s sentence. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2012).
95. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
96. See id.
97. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
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year old to life without parole for a non-homicide offense, but
98
not a seventeen year old.
Although the Supreme Court prohibited these sentences
based on the defendant’s age, it reached its decisions on the
grounds that children are less mature than adults psychologi99
cally, so they should not be punished equally. For instance, in
Roper, the Court reasoned that three relevant characteristics
100
distinguish children and adults. First, children are psychologically less mature than adults, causing them to make poor and
101
reckless decisions.
Second, peer pressure affects juveniles
102
more than adults, giving them less control in some situations.
Third, a juvenile’s character has yet to fully develop, so the
criminal justice system can more easily rehabilitate the juve103
nile. In fact, the Court expounded on Roper in Miller v. Alabama, when it invalidated mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles on the grounds that such rigid and severe
sentences fail to properly account for the defendant’s “age104
related characteristics.”
These age-related characteristics do not necessarily disap105
pear when children turn eighteen. Nonetheless, the court has
drawn a bright line and categorically prohibited death sentences and life without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses
for children that committed the crime before their eighteenth
106
birthday.
This distinction complicates the immigrant age problem.
An immigrant with an estimated birth date could fall on either
side of the constitutionally critical age (eighteen), so the severity of his sentence could potentially depend on an unreliable es107
timate of his age.
98. See id. at 2030 (“[T]hose who were below [the age of eighteen] when
the offense was committed may not be sentenced to life without parole for a
non-homicide crime.”).
99. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
100. Id. at 569–70.
101. Id. at 569; see also L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related
Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417,
421 (2000).
102. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
103. Id. at 570.
104. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012).
105. See Spear, supra note 101, at 419 (noting that characteristics of adolescence may occur in people anywhere from ages twelve to twenty-five).
106. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–89.
107. See Blando e-mail, supra note 33.
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II. ANALYSIS
Because age is relevant at three phases of the criminal justice process, courts must know the defendant’s exact age. Yet
the immigrant age problem hides the defendant’s actual age
when he has an inaccurate birth document. This section explores how these inaccurate birth documents create problems
for the criminal justice system at the three stages where age is
relevant: at charging, while establishing an element of the
crime, and during sentencing.
A. STANDARD OF PROOF FOR AGE JURISDICTION
The immigrant age problem first arises when juvenile
courts must determine whether they have age jurisdiction over
a defendant with an official-yet-inaccurate date of birth. Specifically, courts must determine whether the burden of proof for
age jurisdiction lies with the state when the defendant’s age is
unclear.
Yet these courts cannot look to the Constitution for guid108
ance. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires
the state to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable
109
doubt, and prohibits states from shifting the burden of proof
110
to the defendant, except for affirmative defenses. But age jurisdiction is neither an element of the crime nor an affirmative
111
defense. Therefore, the Due Process Clause dictates neither
112
the burden of proof for age jurisdiction, nor which party bears
113
the burden.
Without constitutional guidance, different jurisdictions
have adopted a number of different burdens for proving age jurisdiction. These standards range from placing the burden on
the state to prove the defendant’s age beyond a reasonable
114
doubt to placing the burden on the defendant to disprove age
jurisdiction so long as a “reasonable basis” exists to believe the
115
defendant is an adult. Within this spectrum of different bur108. See United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 67 (2d Cir. 1981).
109. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
110. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977).
111. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d at 67.
112. Cf. State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 53–54 (Minn. 2011) (rejecting the argument that Due Process requires the state to prove jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt).
113. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d at 67.
114. See State v. Mohamed, 899 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
115. See State v. Sandomingo, 695 P.2d 592, 594 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); see

Pearson_MLR

758

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:745

dens of proof, two distinct approaches to age jurisdiction exist:
(1) jurisdictions that require the state to prove age jurisdiction
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) jurisdictions that require
lower burdens of proof of age jurisdiction.
First, some jurisdictions treat age jurisdiction as the
equivalent of an element of a crime because the court cannot
116
enter a valid conviction unless it has jurisdiction. Because
age jurisdiction is functionally an element of the crime, these
jurisdictions require the state to prove the defendant’s age just
117
as it must prove each element of a crime: beyond a reasonable
118
doubt.
In practice, it is difficult for the state to prove a defendant’s
age beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant needs on119
ly rebut the state’s claims, not prove his own age. For instance, in State v. Mohamed, the State brought forth a catalogue of evidence that defendant was eighteen: her birth
certificate, her booking card, her marriage license, her statement to the police, her co-conspirator’s statement, her child’s
birth certificate, school records, immigration forms, and her
120
application for state welfare benefits. In response, the defendant elicited testimony from an expert witness that many
121
Somali refugees did not know their birth dates. On the balance of this evidence, the trial court remanded the case to juvenile court because the State had not proven beyond a reasona122
ble doubt that the defendant was over eighteen. Short of
prohibitively expensive and invasive bone marrow testing, it is

also Carsons v. Commonwealth, 47 S.W.2d 997, 1001–02 (Ky. 1931) (presuming that the court has jurisdiction and thereby placing the burden on the defendant to disprove jurisdiction). A number of jurisdictions have adopted
standards of proof between these extremes. See Ali, 806 N.W.2d at 54 (preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d
908, 909 (D. Minn. 1999) (shifting burden to defendant once government
makes a prima facie showing of age jurisdiction); State v. Duckett, 107 So.
696, 697 (La. 1926) (clear and convincing evidence).
116. See State v. Neguse, 594 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
117. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
118. See Mohamed, 899 N.E.2d at 1073; cf. Duckett, 107 So. at 697 (interpreting the statute to require the state to prove a child’s age by clear and convincing evidence).
119. See, e.g., Mohamed, 899 N.E.2d at 1073.
120. Id. at 1072.
121. Id. (estimating that over ninety percent of ages assigned to Somali
Bantu refugees were incorrect).
122. Id. at 1075.
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unclear how the State could have ever proved beyond a reason123
able doubt that defendant was over eighteen.
Second, other jurisdictions place a lower burden on the
state to prove age jurisdiction in order to encourage the defendant to put forth information about his age that only he can ac124
cess. These jurisdictions reason that jurisdiction is separate
from the elements of the crime because it does not relate to the
125
defendant’s guilt. And although the defendant’s maximum
penalty may hinge on which court (juvenile or adult) has juris126
diction, the defendant’s age will not directly increase his max127
imum penalty. Therefore, the state need not prove his age
128
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Practically, these jurisdictions recognize that requiring the
State to prove age jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt is
impractical, because unlike other jurisdictional factors—such
129
as where the crime took place —the defendant has unique ac130
cess to the information necessary to prove his age. Indeed,
some courts question whether the state could “ever meet a
standard higher than preponderance of the evidence” where the
131
defendant has an inaccurate or unknown date of birth.
In practice, the lower evidentiary burden forces the defendant to establish his own age, rather than merely rebutting
132
the state’s evidence. For instance, in United States v. Salga123. See id. at 1073–74.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 102 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“The age of the accused, unlike many elements of crimes, is a fact
which at times may be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused and
sometimes, perhaps often, not susceptible to independent proof. Especially is
this so where the accused is an alien.”).
125. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 52–53 (Minn. 2011).
126. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
127. See Ali, 806 N.W.2d at 53 (“[E]stablishing the defendant’s age determines whether jurisdiction lies in the district or juvenile court. Once jurisdiction is established, the defendant will be sentenced only if the State can prove
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
128. See id. But see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)
(“[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be . . . proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944) (finding
federal jurisdiction in the district in which the defendant used the mails illegally).
130. See Ali, 806 N.W.2d at 54.
131. Id.; cf. United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 909 (D.
Minn. 1999) (“At the outset, the court notes the impossibility of definitively
determining defendant’s date of birth.”).
132. See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
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do-Ocampo, the government first produced evidence that the
defendant told various government authorities that he was
133
eighteen years old. Because this evidence met the government’s prima facie burden to prove the defendant’s age, the
134
burden shifted to the defendant to prove his own age, which
the defendant did with evidence uniquely in his possession: his
mother’s testimony, a record of his baptism, and his elementary
135
school records, all of which defendant obtained in Mexico. In
this case, then, the lower burden allowed the court to accumulate all evidence available to both parties before it decided
136
whether it had jurisdiction.
As Salgado-Ocampo illustrates, the benefit of a lower burden of proof for age jurisdiction is deliberation. Rather than
merely rebutting the state’s evidence, the defendant must bring
forth his own evidence of his age. Therefore, to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, the court will have all available evidence, not just evidence the state can obtain.
B. EVIDENTIARY RULES FOR USE OF BIRTH DOCUMENTS AT
TRIAL
When age is an element of the crime—rather than an element of jurisdiction—the state cannot circumvent the age problem by lowering the state’s burden of proof. After all, the Due
Process Clause requires the state to prove each element of the
137
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue, then, is not
whether the state must prove age beyond a reasonable doubt,
but how the state can prove age beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, what evidence may the state use to prove the de138
fendant’s or victim’s age?
Certainly the state may rely on an array of circumstantial
evidence to prove the defendant’s age, including testimony by
139
the victim’s or defendant’s parents, testimony by the victim

133. 50 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 911.
136. See id. at 912–13.
137. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
138. This issue does not arise in an age jurisdiction hearing, because evidentiary rules do not apply to preliminary hearings. See FED. R. EVID.
1101(d)(3); see also United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 913
(noting that evidence admitted at preliminary hearing on age jurisdiction
“may not be admissible in the context of a trial”).
139. See People v. Scott, 141 P. 945, 946 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914).
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141

himself, and even physical appearance. But in many cases,
the state must rely on this circumstantial evidence because it
does not have direct evidence of the victim’s or defendant’s age
142
in the form of a birth certificate. Yet in the immigrant age
problem, the state has the victim’s or defendant’s birth certifi143
cate, but cannot prove its accuracy. Nonetheless, evidentiary
rules still permit the state to introduce this foreign birth certificate to prove age—even if the birth certificate is inaccu144
rate —because
foreign
birth
certificates
are
self145
146
authenticating and excepted from the hearsay rules.
Inaccurate
foreign
birth
certificates
are
selfauthenticating. A foreign document is self-authenticating so
long as a foreign official certifies that the document is an offi147
cial government document. But the official only certifies that
the document is a government record, not that the record is ac148
curate. Therefore, the state (or defendant) may introduce an
inaccurate foreign birth certificate so long as a foreign official
attests that the certificate represents an official government
record.
Even self-authenticating birth certificates must satisfy
149
other evidentiary rules, and the hearsay rules could potentially prohibit a court from admitting a foreign birth certifi150
cate. When the state admits a birth certificate to prove the
defendant’s or victim’s age, it relies on a statement made by an
140. See State v. Scroggs, 96 N.W. 723, 724 (Iowa 1903).
141. See Barnett v. State, 488 So. 2d 24, 24–25 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)
(stating that although the defendant’s physical appearance may be considered
in determining age, some additional circumstantial evidence must be presented as well).
142. Cf., e.g., id. at 24 (“The record supports the appellant's assertion that
the state did not offer any direct evidence of the defendant's age during its
case in chief. There is, however, no requirement that the proof of age be established by direct evidence.”).
143. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying discussion.
144. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying discussion.
145. See FED. R. EVID. 902(3).
146. See id. 803(9).
147. Id. 902(3).
148. See United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 545 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The requirement that the document be ‘certified as correct’ means only that the authenticating official certify that the copy delivered to the court is an accurate
copy of the government record.”).
149. See, e.g., Raphaely Int’l, Inc. v. Waterman S.S., 972 F.2d 498, 502 (2d
Cir. 1992) (noting that the hearsay rules still apply to authenticated foreign
documents).
150. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
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out-of-court declarant (the certificate’s stated date of birth) to
prove the truth of the matter asserted (the defendant’s or vic151
tim’s actual age).
However, a foreign birth certificate would fall under the
hearsay exception for records of birth, so the state could still rely on the certificate to prove the defendant’s or victim’s age.
The hearsay rules except records of birth “if reported to a public
office in accordance with a legal duty,” even if the birth records
152
are inaccurate. This exception could permit a court to admit a
foreign birth certificate, despite its estimated age, as long as
the foreign certificate was made pursuant to a legal duty.
For example, in 1969, the India Parliament passed a law
153
requiring government designees to register all births, but
even thirty years later India still failed to register even half of
154
births in some states. In response to such low registration,
India launched the National Campaign on Birth Certificates in
155
2003. Because the National Campaign on Birth Certificates
156
sought to register all children under ten, a nine-year old Indian child could get a valid government birth certificate, even
157
though the child’s parents might estimate the child’s age. But
despite the estimated date, the hearsay exception for birth records would still permit a court to admit this birth certificate—
the certificate is a record of birth reported to India’s public office pursuant to a legal duty (the Registration of Births and
158
Deaths Act). Because the birth records exception does not
specify when the birth record must be reported, it is legally irrelevant that the Indian child’s parents estimated his age approximately nine years after birth.
Therefore, this hearsay exception coupled with the selfauthentication of certified foreign documents permits the state
to introduce a certified foreign birth certificate as evidence of
151. See id.
152. FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
153. See The Registration of Births and Deaths Act, No. 18 of 1969, INDIA
CODE (1993), vol. 5, § 8(1).
154. See PLAN, COUNT EVERY CHILD: ENSURING UNIVERSAL BIRTH REGISTRATION IN INDIA 8 (2009), available at http://plan-international.org/
birthregistration/count-every-child-in-india.
155. National Campaign to Issue Birth Certificates, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct.
16, 2003, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-10-16/bangalore/
27209625_1_certificates-first-phase-national-campaign.
156. Id.
157. See PLAN, COUNT EVERY CHILD, supra note 31, at 53.
158. See FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
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the immigrant’s age, even when the court cannot determine the
159
reliability of the birth certificate.
But this hearsay exception only applies to birth records,
160
not all government documents that list dates of birth. Therefore, this exception only affects immigrants with foreign birth
161
certificates, not immigrants without any birth certificates. In
cases where the immigrant does not have a foreign birth certifi162
cate—only a birth date that USCIS estimated —the state may
not rely on his government-issued documents to prove age. In
these cases, the immigrant will have neither a foreign record
nor a birth document, so the foreign government records will be
163
neither self-authenticating nor excepted from hearsay rules.
Therefore, the state must prove the immigrant’s age as if he
164
had no documentation listing his date of birth.
C. AGE CHARACTERISTICS AND SENTENCING
It may appear that the sentencing court will know the defendant’s age by the time it must sentence him. After all, prior
to trial the court must determine in a preliminary hearing
whether it has age jurisdiction, a decision that requires the
165
court to find that the defendant is too old for juvenile court.
However, because the age of transfer to district court does
not align with the age of constitutionally permissible execution,
a court may still encounter the age problem at sentencing without guidance from an earlier finding of age. States impose the
166
death penalty almost exclusively on convicted murderers, and
in order to sentence the convicted murder to death the state
must first find that he was over eighteen when he committed
167
the crime. It may seem that prior to sentencing the court al159. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. v. Aronson, 38 F. Supp. 687, 688 (W.D.
Pa. 1941) (“The objection [to the admissibility of the birth certificates] is without merit, as it undertakes to prescribe requirements for the introduction of
foreign records not specified in [the applicable Rules].”).
160. See FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
161. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying discussion.
162. See supra Part I.B.
163. See FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
164. Cf., e.g., United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 910,
913 (D. Minn. 1999) (noting that government documents, including defendant’s driver’s license, “may not be admissible in the context of a trial”).
165. See supra Part II.A.
166. See VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL 69 (3d ed. 2008).
Some states additionally categorize treason and espionage as capital crimes,
but “prosecution and conviction for these crimes are extremely rare.” Id. at 71.
167. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (stating that the
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ready made this finding. The mere fact that a district court had
jurisdiction to try the defendant means that the court previous168
ly found that the defendant was eighteen or older.
But juvenile transfer laws negate this assumption. In
murder cases, thirty five states try children in district court at
ages younger than eighteen by either (a) mandating the juvenile court to transfer the defendant to district court, or (b)
stripping the juvenile court of jurisdiction to try murder cas169
es. In these cases, then, the court will only make one agerelated preliminary finding: that the defendant is over the age
170
of transfer. Significantly, the court will not find that the de171
fendant is over the constitutionally-relevant age of eighteen.
For instance, imagine that an Alabama immigrant with an
estimated age of seventeen-and-a-half commits a capital crime.
Due to Alabama’s statutory exclusion of capital crimes, the juvenile court will not have jurisdiction so long as it finds the de172
fendant is sixteen or older. The defendant has two choices.
First, the defendant can concede that he is sixteen or older and
proceed with his case in district court; the juvenile court then
would not have to make a finding of age. Second, the defendant
can claim that the juvenile court has jurisdiction because he is,
in reality, younger than sixteen. If the juvenile court disagrees,
it will find itself without jurisdiction based on its finding that

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid “imposition of the death penalty
on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed”).
168. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.007 subd. 3 (2012) (granting the juvenile
court jurisdiction over defendants under eighteen years old). Granted, this logic would only apply to jurisdictions where the juvenile court has jurisdiction
over defendants up to age eighteen. Cf., e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7)
(2012) (granting the juvenile court jurisdiction over defendants under sixteen
years old).
169. See PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 4
(2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf (“Functionally, a mandatory waiver law resembles a statutory exclusion, removing a
designated category of cases from juvenile court jurisdiction.”). Through one of
these two mechanisms, 35 states force juvenile defendants charged with murder or “capital crimes” into district court before they reach age eighteen. Id. at
5–6 (noting that the minimum age of transfer in these states ranges from no
minimum age to 17 years old).
170. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127(a) (2012) (requiring the juvenile
court to transfer to district court any child over age fourteen charged with a
capital offense).
171. See supra Part I.C.3.
172. ALA. CODE § 12-15-204(a)(1) (2009).
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173

the defendant is sixteen or older. In either event, the sentencing court will not be able to rely on a previous finding that the
defendant is over eighteen.
Instead, a court could potentially rely on inaccurate birth
documents when it decides whether a defendant is old enough
for the court to sentence him to death or life without parole for
a non-homicide offense. It is unclear how a court would handle
this life or death decision—courts have not encountered this
situation. Yet this issue is likely to arise—currently, at least
1161 people are serving life sentences for crimes they commit174
ted between their seventeenth and eighteenth birthdays. Because the court draws a bright line at eighteen, it is possible
that an immigrant with an age range that straddles this line
175
will commit a capital crime, and a court will have to decide
whether it can constitutionally sentence him as an adult.
In addition, because evidentiary standards at sentencing
176
are less stringent than evidentiary standards at trial, a court
might simply use the date of birth USCIS estimated to determine the defendant’s exact age, even if the assigned date of
177
birth is inaccurate. In fact, because evidentiary rules do not
178
apply to sentencing proceedings, only due process standards
179
directly limit the evidence the court may consider: the evi173. See id. While the juvenile court could enter a specific finding of age
that the sentencing court could use later, courts often resolve matters of age
jurisdiction by merely finding that the defendant is older or younger than the
statutory threshold, perhaps because determining the defendant’s exact age is
nearly impossible. See United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908,
909 (D. Minn. 1999) (“At the outset, the court notes the impossibility of definitively determining defendant’s date of birth.”); State v. Sandomingo, 695 P.2d
592, 594 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the trial court thought the defendant appeared older than seventeen, “but had no definitive means of determining his age”).
174. See AMNESTY INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR
LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES
25–26 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
TheRestofTheirLives.pdf (noting that at least 2225 children were serving life
sentences, and 52.2% of these children committed the crime between their
seventeenth and eighteenth birthdays).
175. Cf., e.g., Hegvik e-mail, supra note 11 (noting that defendant claimed
to be seventeen at the time he committed the crime although his birth certificate indicated that he was eighteen).
176. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
177. See supra Part II.B.
178. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 6A1.3(a) cmt. (2011) (“In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges
are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.”).
179. The appellate abuse of discretion standard does, however, indirectly

Pearson_MLR

766

[98:745

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
180

dence must have “sufficient indicia of reliability.” And even
“uncorroborated hearsay” meets the due process reliability
standard if the defendant has a chance to rebut or explain the
181
hearsay.
Therefore, to make this life-or-death decision—
whether a defendant is old enough to execute—the court can
182
consider a wide range of minimally reliable evidence. This
lower evidentiary standard amplifies the risk that a court will
mistakenly sentence a juvenile to death or life without parole
for a non-homicide offense simply because his estimated birth
date was older than his actual birth date.
III. SOLUTION
Because immigrants with inaccurate-yet-official birth
dates must still face the age-specific boundaries in the criminal
justice system, courts must develop standards to deal with the
age uncertainty of the immigrant age problem. This section
proposes a separate solution for each phase of the criminal justice process where age is relevant: (1) courts should rebuttably
presume that the defendant’s birth document is accurate for
purposes of determining age jurisdiction; (2) courts should not
admit inaccurate birth dates at trial to prove age as an element
of the crime; and (3) courts should consider a defendant’s age
characteristics—rather than trying to determine his actual
birth date—when deciding whether they can sentence the defendant to death or life without parole for a non-homicide offense.
A. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF AGE JURISDICTION
In order to deal with the difficulty of determining whether
a district court has age jurisdiction, courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption that the defendant’s date of birth on his
government documents is his actual date of birth. If the defendant rebuts the presumption, the state must then prove age
jurisdiction by its jurisdictional burden of proof using other
183
means of evidence.
limit the court’s sentencing decision. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McFarlin,
587 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (“Abuse of discretion consists of overlooking pertinent facts, disregarding the force of the evidence, committing an
error of law, or imposing a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum.”).
180. United States v. Ortiz, 636 F.3d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 2011).
181. United States v. Pratt, 553 F.3d 1165, 1170 (8th Cir. 2009).
182. See id.
183. See supra Part II.B.
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Courts should presume that the defendant’s listed date of
birth is accurate for two reasons. First, this presumption solves
the information imbalance that states face when only the defendant “has direct knowledge and control over the information
184
necessary to resolve the dispute” about his age. Functionally,
this presumption requires the defendant to supply the court
with information of which he has direct knowledge and con185
186
trol—such as self-testimony, baptismal records, or school
187
registration —in order to rebut his government-listed age.
Therefore, this presumption will allow the court to resolve the
age problem by considering all documentation available, not
just the limited information available to the state. And this
presumption will also benefit defendants: when their government-listed age is under the juvenile age, the juvenile court will
be presumed to have jurisdiction.
Second, this presumption will not offend constitutional re188
quirements for presumptions. A presumption is constitutional when a rational connection exists “between the fact proved
189
and the ultimate fact presumed.” This presumption would
apply to all cases of age jurisdiction, including cases where de184. State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 54 (Minn. 2011).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 476 (4th Cir. 2012). Currently, the Fifth Amendment shields the defendant from self-testimony in
states that consider age jurisdiction an element of the offense. Cf. United
States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Construction of
the age of the accused as a substantive element of the offense would permit
the accused to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege as to this essential fact,
thereby delaying, if not prohibiting, a determination of the appropriate manner of proceeding.”).
186. United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 911 (D. Minn.
1999).
187. Id. This approach is also similar to the approach other nations take.
For example, in the Philippines courts first consider the child’s birth certificate; then the child’s early birth records, such as baptismal certificates or
school documents; and finally, testimony. See RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (S.C., Feb. 28, 2002) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/courts/supreme/am/am_02_1_18_sc_2002.html.
188. As discussed, some courts hold that age jurisdiction is an element of
the crime that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See discussion
supra notes 116–23 and accompanying text. In courts that hold that Due Process does not mandate any standard of proof for age jurisdiction, the constitutional rules for presumptions in criminal cases will not apply. See supra notes
108–13 and accompanying text; cf. Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger,
Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical
Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1969) (“[I]t has likewise been clear that presumptive language may not be used to circumvent substantive constitutional
rights.”).
189. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
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fendants have accurate birth dates on their documents.
Therefore, in most cases, a rational connection exists between
the fact proved (the birth date on the government document)
and the ultimate fact presumed (defendant’s age). Indeed, in
most cases the presumption is flawless. Because this presumption is true for most defendants—though not defendants with
inaccurate birth dates—it is constitutional.
However, this presumption may fail in states that consider
191
age jurisdiction as an element of a crime. In these states, this
presumption will violate the constitutional requirement that
the state must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasona192
ble doubt, because the presumption functionally shifts the
burden of disproving age jurisdiction to the defendant: the state
can simply point to the defendant’s listed birth date, then the
defendant must prove the date is inaccurate. Therefore, this solution will work only in states that consider age a separate ju193
risdictional element, not an element of a crime.
B. EXCLUSION OF BIRTH DOCUMENTS AT TRIAL
Rules of evidence permit courts to admit foreign certified
birth certificates at trial because these documents are self194
authenticating and excepted from hearsay limitations. Nonetheless, courts should exclude these documents when age is an
element of the crime because these foreign birth certificates
undermine the rationale of the hearsay exception for birth records.
The hearsay rules except birth certificates from the hear195
say rule for two reasons: necessity and trustworthiness. First,
birth documents are necessary to prove age because they often
do not reach the court until years after birth, so forcing a party
196
to prove age by other means would be impractical. Second,
190. This presumption would apply, for instance, to a child born in the
United States whose birth date is not in question.
191. See, e.g., State v. Neguse, 594 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that age was an element of subject matter jurisdiction, which needed
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
192. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
193. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 53–54 (Minn. 2011) (“[W]hen the
age of the defendant determines the jurisdiction of the court, the State has the
burden of proving . . . the defendant’s age on the date of the alleged offense.”).
194. See supra Part II.B.
195. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:93 (3d ed. 2007).
196. Id.
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birth documents are trustworthy because public officials usually create these documents in the ordinary course of work, and
197
there is little dispute over the age. Certainly, the first rationale applies to foreign birth certificates—a defendant’s birth
198
date is nearly impossible to prove without a birth certificate.
But the second rationale does not apply to foreign birth
documents, which do not have the “circumstantial probability
199
of trustworthiness” that justifies the hearsay exception. To
the contrary, these foreign birth certificates may often be inaccurate because they can come from the parent’s estimate of
200
when the child was born, sometimes years after birth. Therefore, the hearsay exception should not apply to these inaccurate
201
birth certificates, and courts should not admit them.
In opposition, states might argue that even if the birth records exception fails in certain cases, the court should nonetheless admit allegedly inaccurate birth certificates. A defendant
can challenge the weight and credibility of his birth certificate
on a case-by-case basis, and the state’s high burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt eliminates the risk of an erroneous de202
cision based on an inaccurate birth certificate alone. Therefore, the court does not need to make an exception to the
hearsay exception—an inaccurate birth certificate is no different than any other disputed evidence.
But the immigrant age warrants special treatment because
it presents a systematic problem that, as a class, undermines
203
the rationale for the birth records exception. Granted, a court
might properly place a burden on the defendant to challenge
197. Id.; cf. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1370 (3d ed. 1942) (noting
that a degree of trustworthiness in a class of evidence justifies each hearsay
exception).
198. See United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 909 (D.
Minn. 1999) (“[T]he court notes the impossibility of definitively determining
defendant’s date of birth.”).
199. See WIGMORE, supra note 197, at § 1370.
200. See discussion supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
201. Alternatively, courts could refuse to authenticate the foreign birth certificate if the certificate appears to be “suspicious in [its] tenor or on [its] face.”
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 195, at § 9:32.
202. See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND STATE COURTS ¶ 803, at 314 (1996) (“If the opponent of the record does not believe the statements contained in the record, he is free to call
the parents for cross-examination or to introduce other evidence controverting
the facts stated.”).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 195–99.
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the weight and credibility of a birth certificate when a single
204
mistake renders the certificate unreliable. In these isolated
instances, the defendant bears only a minimal burden to disprove the accuracy of the certificate, so the court need not cre205
ate an entire exception to the birth records rule. However,
because the immigrant age problem is not isolated, but potentially widespread, inaccurate birth certificates as a class warrant an exception to the birth records exception. Otherwise,
each case would risk an erroneous decision based on the inaccurate document.
At trial, then, the court must first determine whether the
birth certificate is, in fact, inaccurate, considering, among other
206
factors, the defendant’s place of birth, and the listed birth
207
date. If the court finds the birth certificate is inaccurate, it
should exclude the document and instead, the state will have to
prove age as if the immigrant had no listed birthday by relying
208
209
on other evidence, such as testimony, physical appearance,
210
or forensic testing. In addition, to prove the victim’s age the
state (or defendant) could also rely on testimony from the vic211
tim himself.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Austrew, 202 F. Supp. 816, 822 (D. Md.
1962) (admitting victim’s birth certificate even though the certificate reversed
her middle and last names, which “weaken[ed] the document’s evidentiary
value”).
205. Additionally, when the court encounters isolated incidents of unreliable birth documents, instead of invalidating the birth records exception the
court may exclude the evidence as substantially prejudicial in relation to its
probative value. See FED. R. EVID. 403. But because the immigrant age problem is too widespread, a court will better protect the defendant from an erroneous finding by categorically excluding inaccurate birth certificates rather
than finding substantial prejudice in each case.
206. For example, a birth certificate from Central and Eastern Europe
(92% registration rate) would more likely be accurate than a birth certificate
from Sub-Saharan Africa (37% registration rate). See PLAN, COUNT EVERY
CHILD, supra note 31, at 10.
207. For instance, a January 1 date of birth would be more suspect than a
less frequently assigned birth date. See Baxter, supra note 1.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 673–74 (E.D.
Va. 2010).
209. See, e.g., Barnett v. State, 488 So. 2d 24, 24–25 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
210. See, e.g., Andreas Schmeling et al., Forensic Age Estimation in Unaccompanied Minors and Young Living Adults, in FORENSIC MEDICINE: FROM
OLD PROBLEMS TO NEW CHALLENGES 77, 83–94 (Duarte Nuno Vieira ed.,
2011) (describing methods of forensically testing carpus, dental, and clavicle
for age assessments).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Austrew, 202 F. Supp. 816, 822 (D. Md.
1962) (“[U]nder an exception to the hearsay rule of great antiquity, one's own
testimony as to his age is sufficient.”). The Fifth Amendment, however, would
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Of course, relying on this evidence without using the specific date on a birth certificate will make age more difficult for
212
the state to prove—particularly beyond a reasonable doubt.
But not only does omitting suspect foreign birth certificates
comport with the rationale for the hearsay exception for birth
records, it also treats all estimated birth dates equally. Without
this rule, estimated birth dates on foreign birth certificates
would be admissible; estimated birth dates on other official
213
documents would not. With this rule, though, all estimated
birth dates would be inadmissible in a criminal trial. Therefore,
while this rule places a higher burden on the state, it comports
with the rationale of the hearsay exception for birth certificates, and it treats all estimated birth dates equally by making
each inadmissible.
C. AGE CHARACTERISTICS AND SENTENCING
Because a court cannot accurately determine the defendant’s age due to the immigrant age problem, it cannot determine whether the defendant is constitutionally old enough for
the court to sentence him to death or life without parole for a
214
non-homicide offense. Instead, in cases where the defendant
falls close to the crucial age (eighteen), the court should consider whether the defendant’s age characteristics—immaturity,
susceptibility to peer pressure, and character underdevelop215
ment —show that the defendant is culpable enough for the
bar the state from forcing the defendant himself to testify as to his age. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
212. See State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 54 (Minn. 2011) (“[I]t is questionable
in situations in which the defendant's country of origin does not maintain
birth records whether, in a case in which a defendant's age is open to question,
the State could ever meet a standard higher than preponderance of the evidence.”).
213. See supra notes 160–64and accompanying text.
214. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
215. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court called these three characteristics the “hallmark features” of juveniles. 132 S. Ct. 2455,
2468 (2012). But the Miller court also outlined more factors of youthfulness a
sentencing court could consider: (1) the defendant’s family environment; (2)
the extent of the defendant’s participation in the crime; and (3) the defendant’s
inability to navigate the criminal justice system due to his youth, such as his
inability to deal with police or prosecutors, or his “incapacity to assist his own
attorneys.” Id. Under this proposed solution, a court could certainly consider
these factors as further circumstantial evidence of the juvenile’s culpability.
But at minimum, the court should analyze the three “hallmark features” of
juveniles that led the Supreme Court to categorically prohibit death and life
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court to sentence him to death or life without parole for a nonhomicide offense. Specifically, because young adults increase in
216
maturity the most between sixteen and nineteen, a psychological analysis of a defendant with an unknown birth date
might reveal whether he is psychologically mature enough for
217
society to hold him culpable, and to what degree.
This solution has two benefits. First, it is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s rationale for prohibiting death and life
without parole sentences for juveniles that commit non218
homicide offenses: children are different psychologically. This
solution considers the psychological difference between adults
and children by examining whether the child’s psychological
immaturity motivated the (potentially) capital crime.
Second, this solution is practical. Courts currently use
presentence investigation reports to assess sentencing factors,
including the nature of the crime and the defendant’s psycho219
logical profile. Where the court cannot determine the defendant’s age with accuracy, the presentence investigation report
for a crime with a potential sentence of death or life without
parole for a non-homicide offense could also consider the three
age-relevant characteristics: the defendant’s maturity, the role
peer pressure played in the crime, and the defendant’s poten220
tial to further develop and rehabilitate his character. If these
factors suggest the defendant’s youth played a large role in the
crime, the court should not sentence the defendant to death or
life without parole; if these factors were absent, the court could
grant these sentences.
without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2030; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
216. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment
in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 741, 756 (2000).
217. Cf. id. at 757 (“[I]t is important to consider individual differences, rather than simply age, when assessing decision-making ability or maturity of
judgment among adolescents.”).
218. See supra Part II.C. In fact, other scholars have recommended giving
defendants a sentencing discount based on youthful characteristics, not just
age. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence,
24 CRIME & JUST. 477, 487 (1998) (“Even when sufficient cognitive capacity
and emotional control is present to pass the threshold of criminal capacity, a
significant deficit in the capacity to appreciate or control behavior would mean
the forbidden conduct is not as much the offender's fault, and the quantum of
appropriate punishment is less.”).
219. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 7–17 (1984).
220. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
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However, this solution still places a life or death decision in
the hands of the court based on inaccurate factors. While a psychological profile might more accurately predict whether the
defendant is culpable, it still does not accurately predict the defendant’s age. In addition, courts could already use a psychological profile in their current decision—whether the defendant is
221
eighteen—so long as the profile is sufficiently reliable.
Nonetheless, this solution allows courts to assess the culpability by relying on a professional psychological analysis, rather than assessing a defendant’s age based on an estimated
birth date. Therefore, in cases where a court cannot follow the
letter of the law because the defendant’s age is unknown, it
may nonetheless follow the spirit of the law by prohibiting
death sentences for psychologically immature defendants.
CONCLUSION
The immigrant age problem originates when children are
born in countries that do not keep birth records or otherwise
limit children from getting birth certificates. Sometime after
birth, these children receive birth certificates, and their parents estimate the date of birth. When these children emigrate
to the United States, this estimated date of birth becomes their
official date of birth on government documents: immigrant
files, green cards, and driver’s licenses. The government accepts the uncertainty because it does not need an exact age for
monitoring immigration or allocating government resources.
But this uncertainty is unacceptable in the criminal justice system. At three stages of the criminal process—charging, trial,
and sentencing—the criminal justice system distinguishes on
the basis of specific ages. Because of this, immigrants with approximated birthdates on their official government documents
pose a problem at each of these stages.
Yet courts have yet to craft standards to fix the problems.
They have not addressed what burden of proof to use for charging the defendant in district court rather than juvenile court,
whether these documents are admissible at trial, or how the
uncertainty affects constitutional limitations on sentencing. To
alleviate this problem, this Note proposes a different solution
for each step of the criminal process. For charging, courts
should adopt a rebuttable presumption that the listed birth
date is accurate in order to put the burden on the defendant,
221. See United States v. Ortiz, 636 F.3d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 2011).
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who will have more knowledge about his own date of birth, to
prove his own age. At trial, the hearsay rule should bar courts
from admitting the birth documents. Finally, at sentencing,
courts should not attempt to determine the defendant’s actual
age. Instead, courts should consider only the defendant’s age
characteristics—immaturity, susceptibility to peer pressure,
and character underdevelopment—to determine whether the
defendant’s youthfulness prohibits the court from sentencing
him to death or life without parole for a non-homicide offense.

